The Gate

Hi, Mike. Good. We can work with that!

Today's exercises are about your experience of thoughts.

Sit quietly for a few minutes and watch the thoughts come and go.

Where do they come from? Can you see where they originate?

Can you choose which thoughts show up?

Now, as you go about the day, whenever you remember, pay attention from a disinterested perspective to the content of your thoughts.

What proportion of them include an "I" or "me" or "my" component?

When they do include it, how necessary is that component? For instance, compare the thoughts "This is my computer" and "This is a computer." Which one feels more natural, more accurate?

Now look more closely at "This is my computer." What exactly is the connection between "my" and "computer"? Is the computer somehow attached to you? How?

With love,
Steve

Where do they come from? Can you see where they originate?

I don't know where they come from. Perhaps they come from my surroundings, eg I see a story about a mass shooting on the news and think about that. But that story came from an actual event, and the event is made up by people etc. so that really only shows where the thought reached "me" so to speak.

Can you choose which thoughts show up?

No, because there's no meaningful distinction between one thought and another.

What proportion of them include an "I" or "me" or "my" component?

A lot, I think. What is a thought if not an opinion or judgement?

When they do include it, how necessary is that component? For instance, compare the thoughts "This is my computer" and "This is a computer."

Well, yes, in that instance, the "I" makes no difference, it would become a discussion about what "ownership" really means at best. If you're just trying to convey that this is in fact a computer, then my ownership of it makes no difference. But if I'm trying to convey that I do in fact own the computer, then the "I" has quite a big impact because the statement implies that a "self" exists. Same with the thought in regards to an opinion on a mass shooting which was reported on the news as stated earlier; the "thought" about that would probably be some sort of moral outrage, not a completely matter-of-fact thought.

Now look more closely at "This is my computer." What exactly is the connection between "my" and "computer"? Is the computer somehow attached to you? How?

In the context of "direct experience" there is no connection.

Hi, Mike.

I don't know where they come from.

That would have been a good place to stop. :-)

Perhaps they come from my surroundings, eg I see a story about a mass shooting on the news and think about that. But that story came from an actual event, and the event is made up by people etc. so that really only shows where the thought reached "me" so to speak.

All this is speculation and hearsay. When I asked "Can you see where they originate?" I was inviting you to observe your inner workings, to watch how thoughts arise and subside in your experience.

Sit quietly for a few minutes and do that. Can you observe a point of origin? Or does a thought just seem to appear out of nowhere and disappear into nothing?

Can you choose which thoughts show up?

No, because there's no meaningful distinction between one thought and another.

Please say more about "no meaningful distinction."

And let's add another exercise regarding choice and thoughts: Can you choose to stop thinking or to start thinking?

What is a thought if not an opinion or judgement?

There's a crucial distinction to be made between two usages of the word "thought."

One usage refers to the content of a thought, which is usually specific words and/or pictures. When we say a thought is primarily an opinion or judgment, we're using the word in this way. We're referring to the content. In these investigations, this is often called the "thought story."

The second usage refers to the fact of experiencing a thought, regardless of content. When we say that our minds are especially thought-filled, or when we talk about the arising and subsiding of thoughts, we're using the word this way.

Are you clear on this distinction? I'm asking directly because I get the feeling from some of your replies that you're tending to conflate the two meanings. Maybe I've conflated them in the questions. To clarify, when I ask whether you can choose which thoughts show up, I mean the first usage, thought content. When I ask whether you can choose to start or stop thinking, it's the second usage.

But if I'm trying to convey that I do in fact own the computer, then the "I" has quite a big impact because the statement implies that a "self" exists.

Right. Now, as you observe thoughts throughout the day, try to notice in the thought stories commonly recurring themes related to "I" and "me" and "mine." Tell me what some of them are.

With love,
Steve

Can you observe a point of origin? Or does a thought just seem to appear out of nowhere and disappear into nothing?

The thought arises as soon as the mind recognizes it, yes? Not that that isn't a trivial point of origin.

Please say more about "no meaningful distinction."

And let's add another exercise regarding choice and thoughts: Can you choose to stop thinking or to start thinking?

No, there is no meaningful distinction between one thought an another. Actually, this answers the first question about observing a point of origin, too.
All it means is that there's no way to distinguish where "one thought" ends and "another thought" begins. If I were to, for example, try really hard to think of something random, I would think for something random. It would no longer be random, it's being chosen.
And all of that would be one thought process because there's no "start" and "stop" of thought, there's only forward movement.

Are you clear on this distinction? I'm asking directly because I get the feeling from some of your replies that you're tending to conflate the two meanings.

Now I am clear. I just usually didn't specify which to use myself.

Now, as you observe thoughts throughout the day, try to notice in the thought stories commonly recurring themes related to "I" and "me" and "mine." Tell me what some of them are.

Well, most are very similar to the computer example. They almost always express some relation between something and "myself."
If I said, "I am writing a paper," "I" is just a label that refers to my person. It tries to connect my mind to the act of writing.
Or if I said, "I am tired," the same applies.
If that at all makes sense.

Hi, Mike.

...all of that would be one thought process because there's no "start" and "stop" of thought, there's only forward movement.

Interesting. Most people report that there are gaps, even if they're small ones, between thoughts. When you sit quietly for 15 minutes or so and watch your thought activity, do you begin to notice gaps?

If I said, "I am writing a paper," "I" is just a label that refers to my person. It tries to connect my mind to the act of writing.

What exactly do you mean by "my person" here? Be very specific, and try to anchor the response to direct knowledge as much as possible. (I realize it will require some degree of speculation.)

With love,
Steve

When you sit quietly for 15 minutes or so and watch your thought activity, do you begin to notice gaps?

I notice gaps in topics of thought, using this definition of "thought":

the content of a thought, which is usually specific words and/or pictures.

There are no gaps in thought as an experience, using this definition of "thought":

the fact of experiencing a thought, regardless of content.

What exactly do you mean by "my person" here?

Well, I used the term "my person" to clarify what is meant by "I", which admittedly doesn't clarify much. But like I said, it's just a label... The, for example, government considers "my person" to be my body and the things attached to it (e.g. clothes or maybe a backpack).
Now that is obviously not from direct experience. Using d.e. "my person" might refer to my body when it is already presumed (not d.e.) that there is a mind (me) which controls the body.
But you obviously can't find a "self" using direct experience, not in the definition of the term laid out here.

Hi, Mike. Let me see if I get what you're saying. You feel that the experience of thinking is ongoing, even when there's no thought content? Is that what you mean to say?

If so, please explain what observations lead you to that conclusion. What leads you to say you're experiencing thinking when there's no content?

If I've gotten it wrong, please clarify.

In either case, does this ongoing continuity apply even when you're completely absorbed in a beautiful sunset, for instance, or an engrossing movie, or dancing to compelling music. Are you experiencing thoughts during such intervals?

But you obviously can't find a "self" using direct experience, not in the definition of the term laid out here.

Okay, so when you put this together with our previous discussion about direct knowledge being the only available authority to override acquired beliefs, then what more are you expecting to realize here? What you've said is, in essence, already what we guide toward.

What we could do, if you feel there's still something missing, is to investigate the nature of belief. What I'm inferring from your writing is that you already see what we're getting at, but you don't see why it should override your acquired beliefs. Is that close to the mark?

With love,
Steve

You feel that the experience of thinking is ongoing, even when there's no thought content?

...But there is never no thought content. There is always some, however minimal, brain activity, unless of course one is dead.

does this ongoing continuity apply even when you're completely absorbed in a beautiful sunset, for instance, or an engrossing movie, or dancing to compelling music. Are you experiencing thoughts during such intervals?

Yes, of course. Like I said, there is always some brain activity unless the brain is dead (eg being "at a loss for words" is still a state of being).

...direct knowledge being the only available authority to override acquired beliefs, then what more are you expecting to realize here?

What more? I'll answer that in a second. But first, I'd like to clarify... Is this not called "no self"? Is this not supposed to lead to an actualization that there is no "self"? I've only concluded that I cannot find a "self." Not being able to find a "self" certainly does not mean that there is absolutely no "self." All it means is that we can't find one. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. This is the biggest problem I'm having with this, but I think it can be resolved:
Right now, we've concluded that we can't know whether or not a "self" exists because we can't find it with the senses. We are treating the senses as though they are superior as far as discerning truths (and we disregard the "I think, therefore I am" argument for the same reason), when in fact they rely upon the brain, the same as thoughts and logic. It all happens within the brain, be it purely "internal" logic or sensing something via sight or hearing or what have you.
For example, from what I've learned thus far, we can conclude that an apple (just as an example) exists, because we can taste it, we can see it, we can smell it, etc. And as stated earlier, these are all linked to the brain. Sight, taste, smell etc. are processed in the brain, not in the eye or tongue or nose themselves. They are thought processes all the same. However, while we say we can use these thought processes to find out whether or not apple exists, we can't use them to find out whether or not the "self" exists. Why? What is the validity distinction between a thought processed about something one hears or sees and a thought regarding logic?
How then are the senses superior? I don't see how they are. This can potentially resolve my problem by showing how and why one can only be certain of something when sensed.

As to what more I want to realize here, there's tons! Here a few examples:
• Since the senses are still contingent upon the brain (the same brain which processes this logic and thoughts which are often discounted as "secondhand knowledge"), are the senses not just as invalid?

• What, then, is the distinction between “knowledge” and “experience”?

• If there is no self, what does that mean about subjectivity?

• If we recognize thought as an experience (which we did earlier, using your second definition), is it not a part of direct experience as well? Doesn’t that mean we can logically conclude that there is a self? We use some logic to make that induction (from “there is thought” to “there is a thinker”), but of course there is logic used in direct experiences of the five sense (from “I see/hear/feel/smell/taste this object” to “this object exists”) just as well.

• We have (and articles on this site have as well) said that “I” is just a label (they also do this with fear in one article, wherein they ask you to “look behind” the label to see what’s really there, and then conclude that there’s nothing there for example, I assume they mean the same with “I”). But isn’t that all it’s supposed to be? It’s just a word. All nouns are only meant to refer to something. “I” in this case just refers to my brain. Unless we’re going to say that my brain doesn’t process data or also doesn’t exist?

And these are just off the top of my head.

What I'm inferring from your writing is that you already see what we're getting at, but you don't see why it should override your acquired beliefs. Is that close to the mark?

That's very close, yes.

Hi, Mike.

I'm going to make a one-time excursion into philosophy in order to respond to some of your points. I wouldn't ordinarily do this, but I see that for you there are intellectual issues that are so tightly ingrained they need a little loosening before we can proceed. :-)

I'm emphatically not inviting an extended philosophical discussion. That's not what we do here. If that's your preferred modality, there are plenty of other places for it.

They are thought processes all the same. However, while we say we can use these thought processes to find out whether or not apple exists, we can't use them to find out whether or not the "self" exists. Why? What is the validity distinction between a thought processed about something one hears or sees and a thought regarding logic? How then are the senses superior? I don't see how they are.

Ultimately there's no important distinction. I agree. And that lack of distinction could lead you toward concluding that the results of inferential thought do exist or it could just as easily lead you toward concluding that sense objects (like apples) don't exist in the way they're usually believed to.

This can potentially resolve my problem by showing how and why one can only be certain of something when sensed.

Thought stories, including logic, are a large extra step removed from sensory experience. For instance, you're basing your position on the notion that brains process sense data and thoughts, when you've never in your life experienced a brain doing anything of the sort. Nor has anyone else. Nor is it possible, even in theory, for anyone to experience a brain doing anything. You would have no concept of brains doing anything if you hadn't read about them, seen films about them, heard lectures about them, and so forth. None. That brains do the things you claim is nothing more than a set of acquired beliefs.

Now, by trying to give acquired beliefs an equal standing with direct knowledge, you're stacking the deck. You're placing the burden of proof where it doesn't belong. All of those acquired belief systems are hearsay. All of it should be considered suspect until proven otherwise. This investigation can't possibly succeed if you're not willing to subject all your acquired beliefs to scrutiny. You said earlier that you were willing, but you're continuing to demonstrate that you're clinging to beliefs.

For instance, you probably don't believe that the moon is made of green cheese or that Santa Claus lives at the North Pole. Why not? Why are stories about brains more compelling than stories about Santa? What actually distinguishes thought stories that you consider to be statements of fact from ones that you don't? In other words, what does it mean to believe a story as opposed to disbelieving?

In the previous paragraph I've shifted from philosophy-speak to knowledge-speak. I'm not looking for a philosophical answer to those questions. I'm looking for a direct answer, and I'll show you how to go about finding one.

Let's examine a simple, neutral statement: "Phoenix is the capital of Arizona."

We could talk all day about whether that's primarily a linguistic proposition or if it deserves some level of factual interpretation. And we could talk about how we would go about verifying the statement if it's interpreted as factual. But that's not what we're going to do. We're going to look at what we mean experientially when we say "I believe that Phoenix is the capital of Arizona."

Sit quietly. Take a few deep breaths. Close your eyes. Abandon your preconceived notions.

1) Think "Phoenix is the capital of Arizona." How do you feel? (e.g. comfortable, uncomfortable, tingly, relaxed, tense...) What thoughts come up?

2) Think "Oshkosh is the capital of Arizona." How do you feel? (e.g. comfortable, uncomfortable, tingly, relaxed, tense...) What thoughts come up?

3) Imagine someone saying to you, emphatically, "Phoenix is the capital of Arizona!" How do you feel? (e.g. comfortable, uncomfortable, tingly, relaxed, tense...) What thoughts come up?

4) Imagine someone saying to you, emphatically, "Oshkosh is the capital of Arizona!" How do you feel? (e.g. comfortable, uncomfortable, tingly, relaxed, tense...) What thoughts come up?

Now do this exercise at least five more times with five different propositions. Start with simple, neutral ones and transition to ones that are more emotionally charged, like "I'm very competent at _____" or "She loves me."

Become curious, like a child. Have fun. Really sit with each one and observe your responses closely. This is an exploration!

You don't have to report all the details. I simply want to know what you discover about what you experience when you believe something compared to when you disbelieve something. What's the real difference?

And by the way, I take it you don't believe there are unicorns or dragons. So what happened to "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" in those cases? That's rhetorical, just something for you to consider.

With love,
Steve

Before I start, I'd like to say that I'm sorry if it seems that it's been a while since I've posted. My apologies.

This investigation can't possibly succeed if you're not willing to subject all your acquired beliefs to scrutiny. You said earlier that you were willing, but you're continuing to demonstrate that you're clinging to beliefs.

But I do! We just have different ideas of what "scrutiny" is, I guess.

I agree with what you say about how no one could know what experiencing a brain, for example. But that's a different level of "scrutiny" isn't it? I mean "level of scrutiny" as in, someone who believes in solipsism might not believe the external world exists. But that person doesn't just become a potato and refuse to interact with it. Effectively, that person interacts with it, but technically, they don't believe in it. And that I think should clarify what I mean when I say that I agree (for example) that I can't identify a "self", yet I still effectively believe in one.

Now, by trying to give acquired beliefs an equal standing with direct knowledge, you're stacking the deck. You're placing the burden of proof where it doesn't belong.

Regardless, they both ought to be subject to scrutiny. Who is then to say that solipsism isn't true, or that the senses/direct experience is flawless? If we're applying radical doubt, then we can't dismiss the "absence of evidence not being evidence" part...

I understand that all of this is second hand knowledge... You don't have to respond to it, or even take it into account, just thought it could potentially clear some things up.

What actually distinguishes thought stories that you consider to be statements of fact from ones that you don't? In other words, what does it mean to believe a story as opposed to disbelieving?

As far as direct experience goes, I'm not sure I could answer that one. If a feeling of doubt or disagreement isn't direct experience, then I don't know. What about being in a state of disagreement? Would that count?
I mean, some people say that they might get butterflies or tingling in their hands or a slight headache or something similar that correlates with certain feelings, but I usually don't get those.

1) Think "Phoenix is the capital of Arizona." How do you feel?

I feel as if this statement is true, I guess.

2) Think "Oshkosh is the capital of Arizona." How do you feel?

Feeling of doubt.

3) Imagine someone saying to you, emphatically, "Phoenix is the capital of Arizona!" How do you feel? (e.g. comfortable, uncomfortable, tingly, relaxed, tense...) What thoughts come up?

I think, "This correlates with what I've been told and what I have read. I believe this statement to be true."

4) Imagine someone saying to you, emphatically, "Oshkosh is the capital of Arizona!" How do you feel? (e.g. comfortable, uncomfortable, tingly, relaxed, tense...) What thoughts come up?

I think, "Hasn't this person ever read a geography textbook?"

I simply want to know what you discover about what you experience when you believe something compared to when you disbelieve something. What's the real difference?

To have or believe something which contradicts statements presented?

Hi, Mike. Good. You're moving closer to what I'm inviting you to investigate.

If a feeling of doubt or disagreement isn't direct experience, then I don't know. What about being in a state of disagreement? Would that count?

"A feeling of doubt" is fine as a first approximation. We can work with that. So if doubt is a feeling, what are its constituent parts?

I mean, some people say that they might get butterflies or tingling in their hands or a slight headache or something similar that correlates with certain feelings, but I usually don't get those.

That helps to explain some of the disconnect we've been experiencing in communication.

Earlier we were talking about doubt and relief, and you said there was no way to further deconstruct "feeling of doubt." You implied that the label "doubt" was self-evidently correct in the context.

What makes it so? What distinguishes a feeling of doubt from a feeling of anger from a feeling of agreement from a feeling of bliss? There has to be something. Those feelings don't come with labels attached. In other words, we've learned to associate the verbal descriptions with particular feelings. It seems to us they're the appropriate descriptions.

But that would be impossible if we didn't have an experiential way of distinguishing the feelings from one another. What is that way? If it isn't some sort of sensation in the body, however subtle, what else could it possibly be?

Sit quietly and repeat the previous exercise. Keep your eyes closed. Try to be very attuned to the body sensations while you're conducting the thought experiments. And ponder the previous two paragraphs. There must be a distinguishing factor, otherwise there would be no way of choosing one label over another. Find it!

With love,
Steve

I've been having some computer issues since trying to upgrade to windows 10... I'm very sorry :|
anyways...

Earlier we were talking about doubt and relief, and you said there was no way to further deconstruct "feeling of doubt." You implied that the label "doubt" was self-evidently correct in the context.

What makes it so? What distinguishes a feeling of doubt from a feeling of anger from a feeling of agreement from a feeling of bliss? There has to be something. Those feelings don't come with labels attached. In other words, we've learned to associate the verbal descriptions with particular feelings. It seems to us they're the appropriate descriptions.

I don't think this a coherent question. That's like asking what the distinction is between red and green. I can only answer this insofar as we allow secondary knowledge to be allowed (I could answer this with psychoanalytic theory, by saying that doubt and and anger are processed in different parts of the brain using different , showing that different areas of the brain light up under an MRI or CT scan, etc.).
This is a problem with language; we label emotions after we feel them.

But that would be impossible if we didn't have an experiential way of distinguishing the feelings from one another. What is that way? If it isn't some sort of sensation in the body, however subtle, what else could it possibly be?

If we don't consider the brain to be a part of the body... then the question is incoherent to me.

Sit quietly and repeat the previous exercise.

I tried. Perhaps the context that they are felt in, as in, you feel doubt in regards to claims or feel happiness in regards to events you find positive.

There must be a distinguishing factor, otherwise there would be no way of choosing one label over another.

Again, I don't think we can identify this distinguishing factor, like I said, it's kind of like asking to distinguish red from green or asking when a pile of (for example) sand becomes a heap of sand. This is the sorite's paradox... We can't distinguish one color from another, yet we can label them differently; we can't objectively differentiate a heap of sand from a pile of sand, yet we can label them differently. I believe this to be a problem with language and (obviously) subjectivity.

(I could answer this with psychoanalytic theory, by saying that doubt and and anger are processed in different parts of the brain using different , showing that different areas of the brain light up under an MRI or CT scan, etc.).

Whoops, typo'd there and unable to edit the post... It should say:
(I could answer this with psychoanalytic theory, by saying that doubt and and anger are processed in different parts of the brain using different amounts of neurotransmission or what have you, by showing that different areas of the brain light up under an MRI or CT scan, etc.).
Sorry about that.

Hi, Mike.

The entirety of what you just wrote boils down to this: You've predetermined that there's no validity to these questions, so you're refusing to look directly at your own intimate experience in order to find out. It's all an elaborate, thought-up justification for you to remain aloof from the investigation.

We can't continue on that basis. I can't keep coaxing you to look when you keep refusing.

I'll ask you to try looking at one more area, that of choice, decision, control. Many people feel that their sense of self is tied up with being in control, with being the one who chooses. Let's examine whether or not you actually have that kind of control.

Hold your hand a few inches above your leg. (Either hand and leg will do.) Say to yourself, "I'm going to tap my leg sometime in the next 30 seconds." Watch to see what happens. Also observe whether or not thinking "Tap now!" has any effect. Notice exactly what happens when the hand does tap the leg (or if it doesn't).

Are you in control of your hand?

Sit quietly and close your eyes. Notice the experience of hearing. Can you decide to hear or not to hear? Can you decide what to hear?

Open your eyes. Notice the experience of seeing. Can you decide to see or not to see? Can you decide what to see?

Close your eyes again. Notice the experience of thinking. Can you decide to think or not to think? In other words, can you stop and start thoughts at will? Can you decide what to think? Can you decide what the next thought will be? Can you even predict what the next thought will be?

What do you notice now about the feeling that there's a "you" who has control over feelings, sensations, and thoughts? Does it accurately reflect direct experience?

What about preferences? Do you choose your favorite foods? Was there a moment when you said to yourself, "I'm going to like broccoli and hate turnips" or "I'm going to like chicken and hate fish"? Can you choose to change your preferences in food?

Do you choose your favorite music? Was there a moment when you said to yourself, "I'm going to like The Beatles and hate The Rolling Stones" (I'm dating myself!) or "I'm going to like Mozart and hate Beethoven"? Can you choose to change your preferences in music?

What do you find when you look? Is there a "you" that decides? Is there a "you" that prefers? Is there a separate self making these decisions? Or are preferences just experiences that arise involuntarily and get noticed?

With love,
Steve